

**Opposition Deadline: February 11, 2019**  
**Hearing: TBD**

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UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

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In re:	)	
	)	Chapter 11
MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, et al.,	)	Case No.: 09-50026 (MG)
f/k/a General Motors Corp., et al.,	)	
	)	
Debtors.	)	(Jointly Administered)
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**ELLIOTTS' MOTION TO LIFT BAR DATE  
AND PROPOSED [LATE] PROOF OF CLAIMS**

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Celestine Elliott and Lawrence Elliott ("Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs," or "Plaintiffs"), hereby submit their proposed proof of individual, class and representative claims (attached hereto as Exhibit 1)<sup>1</sup> for economic loss relating to a dangerous and defective driver's power door switch installed in their jointly owned 2006 Chevrolet Trailblazer and in thousands of other vehicles manufactured by Old GM, subject to NHTSA Recall No. 14-404000 (July 2, 2014), and owned by residents of the District of Columbia.

### **BACKGROUND**

Mr. and Mrs. Elliott are 83 and 78 years of age, respectively. They have been married for fifty-four years. They are lifelong residents of the District of Columbia. They are each retired commercial drivers with over twenty-five years of on-the-road experience. While Mr. Elliott's physical condition makes walking difficult and prevents him from driving for extended periods of time, Mrs. Elliott has continued to drive part-time since her retirement, first as a "Ride-On" bus driver for the Washington D.C. transit authority, and more recently as a driver for Uber and Lyft. The Elliotts own a home in the District in which they reside with their adult children and grandchildren, as well with as their two young greatgrandchildren, for whom Mr. and Mrs. Elliott provide care, and whom they regularly help transport to and from school, medical appointments, and elsewhere. Exhibit 1, Rider at ¶3.

In 2006, at a now-defunct Chevrolet dealership in the District of Columbia, Mr. and Mrs. Elliott paid full sticker price for a new 2006 Chevrolet Trailblazer. A year later, they paid full sticker price at the same dealership for a new 2007 Chevrolet Cobalt. *Id.* at ¶4.

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<sup>1</sup> The Elliotts recognize that permission to file proof of claim on behalf of absent class members depends on the Court granting a timely motion for class certification. *See In re Motors Liquidation Co.*, 591 B.R. 501 (September 24, 2018) and intend to so move expeditiously.

After GM's public admissions, beginning in February 2014, that New and Old GM had failed to disclose and/or concealed from Plaintiffs and others a myriad of safety related defects in GM vehicles, the Elliotts became extremely hesitant to drive either of their GM vehicles. They feared for their own safety and, in particular, for the safety of their family members. *Id.*

On April 1, 2014, the Elliotts filed a four-page letter as a *pro se* complaint in the Superior Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that each of their two General Motors vehicles had been defective in various respects, that the company had concealed the defects, and that they were entitled to compensation for GM's wrongdoing. New GM removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, moved for dismissal for failure to state a claim, petitioned the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation to consolidate the Elliotts' case with other ignition switch cases in federal courts,<sup>2</sup> and filed their Motion to Enforce in this Court, listing the Elliotts' lawsuit as one of the scores of "Ignition Switch Actions" that New GM alleged had been filed in violation of the 2009 Sale Order and that New GM sought to enjoin. [ECF No. 18620, Schedule 1]

In its May 16, 2014 Scheduling Order, this Court imposed a case management plan in which each of the lawsuits identified by New GM (including the Elliotts' lawsuit) was stayed while the proceedings focused on identified "Threshold Issues" regarding the enforceability of the Sale Order against economic loss Plaintiffs asserting ignition switch claims against New GM based exclusively on a single GM recall, NHTSA Recall No. 14-04700. The Court explicitly stated that it would not treat the issue of whether late claims may be filed against the GUC Trust

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<sup>2</sup> The JPML transferred and consolidated the Elliott's lawsuit with the multidistrict ignition switch litigation it had earlier established, over the Elliotts' objection that their non-ignition switch claims should not be consolidated. The Panel stated that, "while our initial intent was to limit MDL No. 2543 to cases alleging only an ignition switch defect," because non-ignition switch lawsuits such as the Elliotts allege a similar pattern of corporate misconduct regarding safety risks in GM vehicles, efficiency would be served by consolidating non-ignition switch claims against New GM with the ignition switch litigation. Transfer Order, *In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation*, 14-md- 2543 (JMF) [ECF 356, October 17, 2014]

as a threshold issue: “For the avoidance of doubt, the issue of whether a claim asserted in the Ignition Switch Actions is timely and/or meritorious against the Old GM bankruptcy estate (and/or the GUC Trust) is not a Threshold Issue.” [ECF 12697 at 4, n. 4]

To protect the interests of Plaintiffs such as the Elliotts--who were enjoined from taking any action with respect to late claims they may have wished to assert against the GUC Trust--Court provided that:

[T]he GUC Trust agrees that it shall not assert a timeliness objection to any claims that the Plaintiffs may attempt to assert against the Old GM bankruptcy estate and/or the GUC Trust, based directly or indirectly on the ignition switch issue, as a result of the Plaintiffs’ delay in asserting such claims during the “Interval.” For purposes hereof, (a) the “Interval” shall commence on the date of this Order and shall end 30 days after a Final Order is entered with respect to an adjudication of the Threshold Issues (as defined in this Order), and (b) “Final Order” shall mean the entry of an order by a court of competent jurisdiction, and there are no pending appeals, and the time period to file an appeal of such order has expired.

*Id.* at 3.<sup>3</sup>

The Elliotts’ *pro se* lawsuit operative at the time the May 16<sup>th</sup> Scheduling Order was entered alleged both ignition switch and non-ignition switch defects in their Cobalt and non-ignition switch defects in the Elliotts’ Trailblazer. Their entire lawsuit was stayed pursuant to the Order, having been classified as one of the “Ignition Switch Actions” in New GM’s papers and then enjoined as such (over the Elliotts’ objections) under the Court’s May 16<sup>th</sup>, 2014 Scheduling Order.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> On July 11, 2014, the Court modified the Scheduling Order *inter alia* to revise the list of 2014 Threshold Issues. See Supplemental Scheduling Order [ECF No. 12770]

<sup>4</sup> After the Elliotts’ retained counsel in June 2014, they successfully moved in the District Court for the District of Columbia to amend their complaint to remove breach of warranty and other derivative claims, to remove claims related to their Trailblazer, and instead to assert only non-successor liability claims related to ignition switch and other defects in their Cobalt. Their claims were exclusively based on alleged breaches of New GM’s independent duties to them, that is, on New GM’s own wrongdoing. That action, alleging claims about defects in their Chevrolet Cobalt, *Elliott et al v. General Motors LLC*, 14-cv- 14-cv-8382 (JMF), was eventually consolidated with other actions in *In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation*, 14-md- 2543 (JMF). See n. 2, *supra*.

On July 2, 2014, New GM recalled the Elliotts' 2006 Trailblazer, along with other vehicles, to replace a defective driver's power door switch that posed a fire danger. *See* NHTSA Recall No. 14-404000. Exhibit 1, Rider at ¶38.

On August 1, 2014, New GM filed two additional Motions to Enforce the Sale Order, one directed against Plaintiffs in "Pre-Closing Accident Lawsuits" [ECF No. 12807], and another against Plaintiffs asserting "Monetary Relief Actions Other Than Ignition Switch Actions." [ECF No. 12808] On September 2, 2014, at New GM's request, the Court entered scheduling orders regarding the claims of Plaintiffs in "Pre-Closing Accident Lawsuits" [ECF No. 12897] and those of Plaintiffs asserting "Monetary Relief Actions Other Than Ignition Switch Actions." [ECF No. 18898]. The Orders were virtually identical. The Non-Ignition Switch economic loss Order provided that

Until further order of the Court, the schedule governing New GM's Ignition Switch Motion to Enforce (which is subject to various Orders previously entered by the Court, copies of which shall be provided by New GM to Plaintiffs upon written request) shall govern the schedule for the Monetary Relief Motion to Enforce.

*Id.* at 2, ¶1.

The effect of the three Scheduling Orders, taken together, was to impose a case management plan in which the identified "Threshold Issues" presented by New GM's Motion to Enforce against Ignition Switch economic claims related to NHTSA Recall No. 14-047 would be litigated to finality before this Court would begin consideration of the claims of pre-closing

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In this Court, the Elliotts declined to enter stay stipulations that other parties had executed, and instead submitted a "No Stay Pleading," pursuant to procedures outlined in the May 16<sup>th</sup> Scheduling Order for parties unwilling to "voluntarily" stay their lawsuits, and with leave of the Court to submit such pleadings out of time upon counsel's appearance in the matter. The Elliotts also moved for dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing *inter alia* that the Court had no statutory or constitutional authority to enjoin independent, non-derivative claims against New GM for its own wrongdoing. The Court denied the Elliott Plaintiffs' Motion and No Stay Pleading on August 8, 2014. *See In re Motors Liquidation Co.*, 514 B.R. 377 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), *aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and vacated in part, Elliott v. Gen. Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.)*, 829 F.3d 135, 159-61 (2d Cir. 2016).

accident victims or the claims of Plaintiffs asserting economic loss based on non-ignition switch hazards—such as those presented by the Elliotts’ Trailblazer allegations.

On any fair reading, the provisions estopping the GUC Trust from claiming delay during the “Interval” that appeared in the extensive May 16, 2014 Scheduling Order were intended to be incorporated with the rest of the May 16th schedule that the summary September 2, 2014 Scheduling Orders incorporated by reference—the protection of Plaintiffs from being accused of delay while they complied with the Court’s case management Orders was part of the “schedule” under which Pre-Closing Accident Plaintiffs and Non-Ignition Switch economic loss Plaintiffs were to refrain from prosecuting their claims pending resolution of the 2014 Threshold Issues. In fact, without such protection, the Court’s Scheduling Orders would have produced the very piecemeal and chaotic litigation that Judge Gerber was explicitly trying to avoid, as Plaintiffs asserting a myriad of Non-Ignition Switch and Personal Injury claims would have sought to litigate their ability to pursue late claims in order to protect their rights and to avoid later accusations of delay by the GUC Trust. Judge Gerber had made clear that “jumping the line” by trying to litigate such claims before litigation of the “threshold issues” would not be tolerated.<sup>5</sup>

On September 19, 2014, the Elliotts joined the *Bledsoe* lawsuit to assert independent and non-derivative claims for economic loss against New GM regarding the Trailblazer’s defective power door module switch on behalf of themselves and similarly situated residents of the District of Columbia.<sup>6</sup> The lawsuit was listed as a “Monetary Action Other Than An Ignition Switch

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<sup>5</sup> See, e.g., *In re Motors Liquidation Co.*, 513 B.R. 467, 470 (Bankr.S.D.N.Y.2014) (*Phaneuf*); 514 B.R. 377, 380 (2014) (*Elliott*); 534 B.R. 538, 540-41 (2014) (*Sesay*).

<sup>6</sup> See *Bledsoe et al. v. General Motors LLC*, 1:14-cv-7631 (S.D.N.Y) (JMF), consolidated in *In re General Motos LLC Ignition Switch Litigation*, 14-md-2543 (JMF).

Action” on a supplement to New GM’s third motion to enforce the sale order, [ECF No.12938 at 4], and accordingly stayed.<sup>7</sup>

Following this Court’s April 15, 2015 decision, its June 1, 2015 Order disposing *inter alia* of the 2014 Threshold Issues, and its certification of those rulings for direct review to the Circuit Court, the Elliotts successfully petitioned the Second Circuit Court of Appeals for direct review. The Court of Appeals affirmed this Court’s finding of a due process violation with respect to the ignition switch plaintiffs, reversed its finding that ignition switch plaintiffs suffered no prejudice from the violation with respect to successor liability claims, reversed this Court’s construction of the Sale Order to encompass the Elliotts’ and other plaintiffs’ independent, non-derivative claims against New GM for its own wrongdoing, reversed this Court’s ruling with respect to the rights of post-closing used vehicle purchasers, and vacated this Court’s injunction of the claims of non-ignition switch plaintiffs and remanded for further proceedings in this Court. *Elliott v. Gen. Motors LLC (In re Motors Liquidation Co.)*, 829 F.3d 135, 157-59, 166 (2d Cir. 2016).

Following the Court of Appeals decision, this Court entertained the parties’ proposals on how to proceed. Pursuant to the Court’s Order to Show Cause entered on December 13, 2016 (No. 13802), Plaintiffs joined the Omnibus Motions to File Late Claims submitted by Designated and Lead Counsel representing other parties. [ECF No. 13811]. Plaintiffs were not then required to submit proposed proofs of their claim. Order at 4, ¶1. While briefing regarding whether the Court should permit submission of late claims of behalf of *Ignition Switch Plaintiffs*<sup>8</sup> has been

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<sup>7</sup> Like the *Elliott* Plaintiffs, the *Bledsoe* Plaintiffs declined to enter into a stay stipulation and instead submitted a No Stay Pleading contending that the 2009 Sale Order injunction did not apply to them because they were not notified and accorded an opportunity to be heard prior to its entry, and that this Court lacked authority to enjoin independent, non-derivative claims against Non-Debtor New GM. This Court rejected their contentions. Endorsed Order, November 10, 2014 [ECF No. 12991].

<sup>8</sup> Ignition Switch Plaintiffs refers to the 1.8 million or so parties claiming economic loss, personal injury or property damage in connection with the ignition switch defect that was the subject of NHTSA Recall No. 14-047.



completed (Nos. 13869-13874; 13879; 13881-13884), the Court stayed consideration of the relief sought by Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs, including the Elliotts, pending resolution of the 2016 Threshold Issues.<sup>9</sup> Following the final resolution of the 2016 Threshold Issues, and pursuant to the Court's *Order Scheduling Case Management Conference*, dated Nov. 6, 2018 [ECF No. 14377], the parties conferred and reported to the Court that the Ignition Switch and Certain Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs were pursuing a settlement with the GUC Trust of their late claims, but that the Non-Ignition Switch claims regarding the Elliotts' 2006 Trailblazer would not be encompassed by the anticipated proposed settlement. The Court adopted the parties' proposed schedule requiring that the Elliotts submit their proposed claim by January 21, 2019, that the GUC Trust file any objection by February 11, 2019. [ECF Nos. 13882-83].

**BASES FOR REQUEST FOR THE COURT TO LIFT THE BAR DATE AND PERMIT  
SUBMISSION OF THE ELLIOTTS' TRAILBLAZER CLAIMS**

As more fully discussed below, Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs including the Elliotts are entitled to file their claims against the GUC Trust because their constitutional and statutory due process rights to notice and to a reasonable opportunity to be heard before their valuable property interests are extinguished preclude the application of the Bar Date Order or the Late Claims Order to them on one or more of the following grounds:

- 1) If, on June 1, 2009, when Old GM filed its Petition in this Court, neither Old GM nor Plaintiffs knew or should have known about the safety hazard in the driver's power door module switch that was later recalled by New GM, then Plaintiffs who owned vehicles with latent safety defects were unidentifiable "future claimants" for whom no notice could be effective, and who therefore could not constitutionally be subject

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<sup>9</sup> The Court directed that

[W]hile the briefing and adjudication of the Late Claim Motions filed by Brown Rudnick LLP and/or Goodwin Procter LLP on behalf of Ignition Switch Plaintiffs is intended to go forward, the relief sought by Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs shall be stayed pending the Court's resolution of the other 2016 Threshold Issues and no briefing with respect to the Late Claim Motions filed on behalf of Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs shall take place pending such stay.

*Id.* at 5, ¶2.

to the Bar Date Order or the Late Claims Order (or to the Sale Order and Injunction, for that matter), without the necessity of further consideration of the *Pioneer* factors;

- 2) If Old GM knew or had reason to know of the driver's power door module switch defect--as Old GM has been found to have known and suppressed information about the ignition switch defect--then Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs would have been "known creditors" who were entitled to and did not receive actual notice, and whose claims should proceed to the same extent and in the same fashion as the claims of the ignition switch plaintiffs according to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, again without further consideration of the *Pioneer* factors;
- 3) If Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs are found to have been neither future claimants nor known creditors, but instead unknown creditors, the Bar Date and Late Claims Orders nevertheless cannot preclude the Elliotts and the District of Columbia consumers whom they seek to represent because:
  - a. the scope and intensity of the publication campaign was not reasonably calculated to reach and alert ordinary consumers in the District of Columbia. The handful of national and international newspapers for which the Court approved *one-time* publication, to occur merely thirty-days before the Bar Date, primarily served the business and financial communities, and publication in those newspapers was not reasonably calculated to reach the Elliotts and other GM vehicle owners of the District of Columbia, to say nothing of the tens of millions of consumers who owned GM vehicles across the nation; and/or
  - b. the form and content of the Notice approved for publication were not reasonably calculated to alert the Elliotts and other consumers that their valuable rights might be extinguished. The Notice did not fairly advise GM vehicle owners that their rights to sue for latent defects in their vehicles would be forever extinguished if they failed to file a proof of claim. The Notice was a virtually illegible "Legal Notice," written in confusing and legalistic language incomprehensible to ordinary consumers such as the Elliotts and other owners of GM vehicles.

Alternatively, if the *Pioneer* factors are deemed relevant, Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs should be permitted to file the late claims, as discussed below.

1. *Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs Such as the Elliotts Who Owned Cars With Latent Defects Unknown to Themselves or to Old GM When GM Filed its Petition Were Future Creditors Whose Claims Could Not Constitutionally be Precluded by the Bar Date Order.*

If, when Old GM published notice of the Bar Date in November 2009, Old GM did not know or have reason to know of the power door switch hazard, then the Elliotts were then “future claimants” with respect to the claims that would manifest in a “right to payment” years later when the defects in GM vehicles like theirs became known. Because future claimants “cannot possibly be identified” at the time notice of the Bar Date is issued, “and thus cannot be provided notice of the bankruptcy,” their claims cannot be adversely affected by the bankruptcy proceedings. *See In re Grumman Olsen Indus.*, 467 B.R. 694, 707 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). Future claims “cannot be extinguished without due process for the future claimants.” *Id.* at 708.

Although known creditors are entitled to actual notice of the Bar Date, and unknown creditors may be provided constructive publication notice, no notice provided would have satisfactorily informed the Elliotts of their rights in a claim they did not yet know they held. *See In re Waterman S.S. Corp.*, 157 B.R. 220, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (“The Bankruptcy Court correctly held that the potential future claims of those who had not manifested any detectable signs of disease when notice of the bar date was given were not discharged in the bankruptcy proceeding.”); *In re Hexcel Corp.*, 239 B.R. 564, 571 (N.D. Cal. 1999) (holding publication notice sufficient for “creditors who could contemplate that they might have a claim ” but not creditors with “no way of knowing that it may have a claim against the debtor some time in the future”). *In re Pettibone*, 162 B.R. 791, 808 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.1994) (“The Bankruptcy Code does not require a party. . . with no known interest in a bankruptcy proceeding to monitor national financial papers and read notices about businesses against which they have no known claims to guard against the possibility they might later be held on notice of claim bar.”). Due process requires that all “creditors receive notice of the debtor's bankruptcy case and applicable bar date so that [they] have an opportunity to make

any claims they may have against the debtor's estate.” *In re XO Commc'ns, Inc.*, 301 B.R. 782, 792 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003).<sup>10</sup>

While the appointment of a future claims representative may have protected the interests of future claimants such as the Elliotts, none was appointed here to represent owners of GM vehicles with latent defects that would not become known until years after the closing. “Without the appointment of ... [a future claims representative] to provide adequate representation to the absent future claim holders, it is doubtful that the injunction provisions binding them would be found to comply with the due process clause.” *In re Johns-Manville Corp.*, 551 B.R. 104, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 2016); *see also In re Grumman Olson Indus., Inc.*, 445 B.R. 243, 254 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), *aff'd*, 467 B.R. 694 (S.D.N.Y. 2012):

[Plaintiffs'] rights were not protected through the appointment of a future claims representative and the creation of a trust to pay their claims. ... Every case that we have found addressing this issue has concluded for reasons of practicality or due process, or both, that a person injured after the sale (or confirmation) by a defective product manufactured and sold prior to the bankruptcy does not hold a “claim” in the bankruptcy case and is not affected by either the § 363(f) sale order or the discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d).

Because the Elliotts and those they seek to represent were future claimants unidentifiable at the time that the Bar Order was entered, and because their interests were not protected by the

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<sup>10</sup> The Court of Appeals has not yet definitively ruled on the “future claims” question presented here:

This Court has not decided, however, “the difficult case of pre-petition conduct that has not yet resulted in detectable injury, much less the extreme case of pre-petition conduct that has not yet resulted in any tortious consequence to a victim.”

*Elliott v. General Motors LLC*, 829 F.3d 135, 156 (2d Cir. 2016), *quoting “In re Chateaugay Corp. (“Chateaugay I”), 944 F.2d 997, 1004 (2d Cir. 1991).* The Court suggested that, at the very least, for a “future claim” to constitute a “claim” extinguishable in bankruptcy proceedings, there must be pre-petition contact or relationship between the debtor and the future claimant “that makes identifiable the individual with whom the claim does or would rest.” *Id.* Notably, Plaintiffs owning vehicles with latent defects, unknown either to themselves or to GM, were not under this standard “identifiable” and thus did not hold a claims that could be barred.

appointment of a future claims representative, their due process rights preclude application of the Bar Date or Late Claims Orders to them.

2. *If Old GM Knew or Should Have Known of the Non-Ignition Switch Defect, Then Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs Such as the Elliotts Were Known Creditors Whose Claims Could Not Have Been Precluded Without Actual Notice of the Bar Date Order, Which They Did Not Receive.*

Plaintiffs have grounds to believe that, consistent with its corporate culture at the time, Old GM very well might have known of and concealed the hazards of the power door module switch in the Elliotts' Trailblazer and similar vehicles, just as it did with the ignition switch defect. Exhibit 1, Rider at ¶¶5-27, 30-40. Plaintiffs have learned that NHTSA's Office of Defect Investigations (ODI) received a complaint about a fire starting in the driver's door of a 2006 Trailblazer as early as November 6, 2008, and that ODI received some 170 reports alleging a thermal event in the driver door switch between November 2008 and November 2012 in vehicles including the Elliotts' Trailblazer ultimately recalled by New GM. ¶¶30, 39. New GM has acknowledged the receipt of 619 unique consumer complaints related to the driver door switch, 77 of which led to fire with flame. *Id.* at 40. Plaintiffs have not yet had the benefit of discovery, either in this Court or in the MDL Court, with respect to Old GM's knowledge of the power door switch hazard.

If discovery reveals that Old GM knew about the driver's power door module switch defect, then the Elliotts and those they seek to represent would have been known creditors entitled to actual notice of the Bar Date Order. Because they did not receive such notice, they are not bound by the Bar Date Order and should be free to file their claims against the GUC Trust now. If Old GM knew about but concealed the defects about which they complain, then the

Elliotts would be in the same position as the ignition switch Plaintiffs.<sup>11</sup> Creditors are not bound by orders issued during bankruptcy proceedings prior to the time they receive adequate notice of the bankruptcy. *See In re Grumman Olson Indus.*, 467 BR at 706. This principle prevents courts from barring a creditor's claim as untimely when that creditor never received adequate notice of the bankruptcy. *See In re Residential Capital, LLC*, No. 12-12020 (MG), 2015 WL 2256683, at \*6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 11, 2015).

3. *If Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs Such as the Elliotts are Deemed to Have Been Unknown Creditors in June 2009, Their Claims Could Not be Precluded Without Publication Notice Reasonable Calculated to Reach Them and to Apprise Them of Their Interests in the Litigation.*

In some circumstances, notice by publication may satisfy due process for unknown creditors, *Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 317 (1950); *City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.*, 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953), but the publication notice campaign must be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [creditors] of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections,” *Mullane*, 339 U.S. at 314. Whether notice procedures are reasonably calculated to reach unknown claimants “depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.” *Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope*, 485 U.S. 478, 484 (1988); *see also Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy*, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (“The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.”). The mere fact that notice was published in a newspaper of general circulation is not,

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<sup>11</sup> The Court of Appeals recognized the need for a fuller record on which to determine whether Old GM knew or should have known of Non-Ignition Switch defects such as those asserted by the Elliotts. This Court left as an open question whether Old GM knew of the Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs' claims based in other defects. ...Without factual findings relevant to determining knowledge, we have no basis for deciding whether notice was adequate let alone whether enforcement of the Sale Order would violate procedural due process as to these claims.  
829 F.3d at 166.

by itself, sufficient to demonstrate that due process was satisfied. *Hecht v United Collection Bur., Inc.*, 691 F3d 218, 225 (2d Cir 2012) (a more extensive campaign of notification beyond limited publication in a national periodical, including local publications and electronic media, was necessary to satisfy due process).

"[W]hen notice is a person's due, *process which is a mere gesture is not due process*. The means employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it." *Mullane*, 339 U.S. at 315, 70 S.Ct. 652 (*emphasis added*)

*a. The scope and intensity of publication were not reasonably calculated to reach GM consumers in the District of Columbia.*

The Notice Order proposed by Old GM and entered by this Court limited publication notice of the Bar Date to a one-time publication at least thirty days prior to the Bar Date in following newspapers: the global edition of *The Wall Street Journal*, the national edition of *The New York Times*, the global edition of *The Financial Times*, the national edition of *USA Today*, *Detroit Free Press/Detroit News*, *Le Journal de Montreal*, *Montreal Gazette*, *The Globe and Mail*, and *The National Post*. [ECF No. 4079 at 7] This selection was perhaps aimed at the financial and business community but it was not targeted to reach the consumers who owned GM vehicles. Of the newspapers, only *USA Today* might have potentially reached some small number of GM consumers across the country, but the one-time publication thirty days before the Bar Date in a single outlet potentially reaching only a small fraction of GM consumers was not a "means employed ...by one desirous of actually informing" the tens of millions of GM vehicle owners, but rather, at best, "a mere gesture."

Considering the size of the GM Bankruptcy, and the tens of millions of GM consumers scattered across the United States, a more far-reaching effort to provide notice was essential to ensuring due process was satisfied. Notably, the record is devoid of any rationale for the choice

of publications or to support the reasonableness of the notice campaign in general, much less the kind of evidence-based expert testimony that could have demonstrated the necessary scope and intensity of publication beyond the mere conjecture that seemed to rule the day here.

GM knew it had tens of millions of consumers residing across the United States. GM expanded its business operations to reach the entire country and influence millions of potential customers. Yet it did not treat the publication of the Bar Date notice in this Case with the same dedication to reaching consumers. When there is such a wide disparity between the size of a debtor's business and the reach and diversity of the publications it uses for notifying its own consumers of its bankruptcy, "[d]ue process affords a re-do." *In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc.*, 528 B.R. 251, 260 (D. Del. 2014) (*quoting Wright v. Corning*, 679 F.3d 101, 107 (3d Cir. 2012)). GM included local publication in Detroit in its notice plan but failed to publish the notice in local or regional papers throughout the United States, in the diverse areas in which its customers resided. GM was in the business of manufacturing and selling vehicles. GM categorically failed to design a publication campaign reasonably calculated to reach GM customers. GM customers' particular identities might have been unknown, but surely the likelihood that the group of then unknown GM vehicle owners would constitute a major proportion of "unknown creditors" once their vehicles' latent defects became manifest was not unknowable—and the failure to target a publication campaign reasonably designed to reach them violated GM's customers' due process rights. *See In re New Century TRS Holdings, Inc.*, *id.* at 260 (publication notice violated due process when debtor, a lender, published one-time in the national edition of *USA Today*, and another notice in an area with a large concentration of debtors' employees, but had no publication plan to reach its million or so borrower-customers).



The narrow time window between the Bar Date and the publication notice (45 days) exacerbated the problems with the limited scope and intensity of the GM publication program. In circumstances such as this, with the debtor rushing through the bankruptcy process and leaving such little time to file claims for consumers who did receive notice, the debtor should “have a heavier burden to ensure that notice is widespread.” *Id.*

When courts find that publication of notice in newspapers of general circulation satisfies due process, it is often also supplemented with publication in local papers. *See, e.g., Wright v. Corning, supra.* In this case, no effort was made to supplement the Debtor’s notice regime with local publications that would be more accessible to the Plaintiffs at the time the Bar Date Order was entered. Significantly, the record is utterly devoid of evidence that any attention whatsoever was paid to the need to reach the tens of millions of owners of Old GM vehicles. Accordingly, Plaintiffs rights to notice and an opportunity to be heard were violated and the Bar Date Order may not be constitutionally applied to prevent them from filing their claims against the GUC Trust now.

- b. *The content and form of notice approved for publication did not adequately convey to Plaintiffs that their rights to sue for a danger that may not become known until years later would be affected by GM’s bankruptcy.*

To satisfy due process, all published notices must “convey the required information” necessary for a creditor to understand that its rights may be adversely affected by the bankruptcy. *In re Ritchie Risk-Linked Strategies Trading (Ireland), Ltd.*, 471 B.R. 331, 338 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012). But even if a consumer found and read the published notice, the notice could not have informed them of their future claim. This 2009 notice did not mention the existence of the door module defect that was the subject of Recall No. 14V-404 in July 2014. No information provided

in the 2009 notice would have adequately informed the Elliotts and others of a claim that would not arise until years later.

Even apart from the failure to specify the particular power door switch defect, the content of the Notice published by GM contained insufficient information generally to inform a reasonable GM vehicle owner that his or her rights would be adversely affected by the Bankruptcy in the event that vehicles that were performing properly at the time of the Notice came to develop hazards later. *Cf. In re Chemtura Corp.*, 505 B.R. 427, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (due process satisfied if *inter alia* the bar date notice made explicit that those who may develop injuries later from pre-bankruptcy exposure may have their rights affected). Even if the Elliotts and other GM consumers had sufficient knowledge of GM's bankruptcy, this alone is insufficient to bar their claims unless they were properly and adequately notified of the Bar Date and its effect on their right to sue. *See City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.*, 344 U.S. 293, 297 (1953). The notice issued could not have informed them that their future claims, which were "abstract, unimaginable, and inchoate at the time," would later be barred in this Case. *In re Johns-Manville Corp.*, 600 F.3d 135, 158 (2d Cir. 2010).

Moreover, as this Court itself observed at the time, the Notice was laden with legal jargon that would have prevented any reasonable consumer from understanding its terms and import in any event.<sup>12</sup> The purpose of disseminating notice in bankruptcy is to ensure interested parties

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<sup>12</sup> The Court stated:

I agreed with the point that the notice was kind of verbose and legalese....One point that was made in the papers did hit a responsive chord with me. I'm not going to direct that the notice be rewritten, but I think that the objection that it was wordy and lawyeresque and legaleseque was well taken. I think as a matter of best practices, the debtors' community should start working on preparing its bar date notices in something closer to plain English. But I am not going to, today, order that something that would be a matter of best practices will be turned into a requirement, at least not in this case.

Transcript of the September 14, 2009, Hearing on the Debtors' Motion for Order Pursuant to Section 502(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 3003(c)(3) Establishing the Deadline for Filing Proofs of Claim Including Claims Under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code and Procedures Relating Thereto and Approving

have enough information to fully understand how their rights could be affected by the case and what actions are necessary to preserve those rights. As the Court stated in *Mullane*, “[t]he notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information.” *Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co.*, 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). If the notice is written in any way other than plain English, there is a risk interested parties may not understand what the notice is required to convey. Accordingly, when a debtor’s notice includes an inordinate amount of legal jargon concealing the essential information in the notice, due process cannot be satisfied for those parties without the knowledge of legal terminology needed to decipher the notice. *See In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.*, 851 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1061 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (ruling notice satisfied due process because “written in easy-to-understand plain English.”).

The notices that GM published in this case are a textbook example of obscurantism.<sup>13</sup> GM vehicle owners are never mentioned, lists of statutory definitions and exclusions with formal citations are included, those having “claims” are purportedly alerted, but the Notice defines “claims” to include a “right to payment,” and later the Notice, in larger bold font, instructs those who do not hold “claims” that they should *not* file a proof of claim. *Id.* Only bankruptcy law experts schooled in the split among courts interpreting the core concept of “claim” under the Bankruptcy Code could begin to understand the otherwise convoluted and apparently contradictory messages—at least when read by those, like the Elliotts, who owned GM vehicles for which no defects were known and who then had no “right of payment”—and therefore who

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the Form and Manner of Notice Thereof at 37 [ECF 4081]. The Court did not provide further explanation why it approved the content of the Notice despite these observations.

<sup>13</sup> Certificate of Publication [ECF 4290], attached hereto as Exhibit 2.

could be not reasonably be expected to understand that their rights were to be affected, even had they seen and attempted to parse the publication notice that GM provided.

GM published its notice using a font size that made it nearly illegible for anyone without a magnifying glass, with its text so crammed together that virtually no space whatsoever is visible around it or between apparent sections and subsections. *Id.* To satisfy the demands of due process, a debtor's published notice must be readable. When the notice is written in a fine print that prevents interested parties from reading it, courts have regularly ruled that due process would be violated if unknown claimants were deemed to have read it. *See In re Greenwich Sentry, L.P.*, 471 B.R. 800, 806–07 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.), *aff'd*, 484 B.R. 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), *aff'd*, 534 F. App'x 77 (2d Cir. 2013) (upholding bar date notice written in “bold font and capital letters”); *First Assembly of God of Naples, Fla., Inc. v. Collier Cty., Fla.*, 20 F.3d 419, 422 (11th Cir.) (noting that notice “less than ¼ page in size” and without “a headline in 18 point type” was a “deficiency” in the notice); *In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig.*, 962 F. Supp. 450, 528 (D.N.J. 1997) (explaining that “notice must be readable” to satisfy due process).

Notably, no notices were published in Spanish, or placed in Spanish language publications.

The Elliotts invite the Court to review the copies of the actual published Notices that GM provided. *See* Exhibit 2. Even a cursory review of the combination of legalistic jargon, a virtually illegible and tiny font, provisions densely packed together, placement amid other “Legal Notices,” confusing terminology, and the omission of any mention of GM vehicle owners, confirms that the Notice was not reasonably calculated to give GM vehicle owners notice that any claims they might hold might be affected in the GM bankruptcy, much less notice that their

ability to sue for defects that may arise later in the course of their use of GM vehicles would be barred.

The GM Bankruptcy was the largest industrial bankruptcy in American history. GM had tens of millions of customers across the nation. Plaintiffs submit that even a cursory review of the Notice in its published form confirms that Plaintiffs were not accorded the due process that the Constitution required in the circumstances.

*4. The Pioneer Factors are Satisfied Here.*

The Supreme Court in *Pioneer Invest. Services v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship*, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993), set out the authoritative test for determining whether a court may exempt a party's failure to meet a bar date for filing a proof of claim under "excusable neglect." Whether neglect is excusable is based on four equitable considerations including: "the danger of prejudice to the debtor, the length of delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith." *Id.* However, "not all factors need to favor the moving party" for a court to accept a late proof of claim. *In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.*, 370 B.R. 90, 101 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007). The Second Circuit places considerable weight on the reason for delay and weighs less equally the other factors. *See Williams v. KFC Nat'l Mgmt. Co.*, 391 F.3d 411, 415-16 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[I]t is the third factor-the reason for delay-that predominates, and the other three are significant only in close cases."); *In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc.*, 433 B.R. 113, 120 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (explaining the Second Circuit's "hard line" approach to Pioneer, which "focuses primarily on the reason for the delay, and specifically whether the delay was in the reasonable control of the movant."); *In re Dana Corp.*, 2007 WL 1577763, at \*4

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007) ([T]he Second Circuit . . . focus[es] on the reason for delay as the predominate factor.”).

Evaluating these factors in light of the facts of this case, the Court should find that the Elliots’ late filing qualifies as excusable neglect and that the late-filed proof of claim should be allowed. The Elliotts were fully entitled to receive notice of the Bar Date, and thus the opportunity to participate in the bankruptcy, before their claims could be barred. GM’s publication notice was insufficient to adequately notify the Elliotts of the adverse effect on their rights that GM’s bankruptcy could create. The Bar Date notice was posted in publications that were not reasonably calculated to reach them, and it did not contain the requisite information to put the Elliotts on notice that their future claims would be extinguished. The Movants were unable to file timely proofs of claim due to these inadequacies in the notice that were entirely out of their control. Permitting the Movants to file late proofs of claim is the only remedy that will protect their rights in this case. *See In re Johns-Manville Corp.*, 600 F.3d 135, 158 (2d Cir. 2010); *In re Motors Liquidation Co.*, 529 B.R. 510, 583 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).

The GUC Trust will not be prejudiced by permitting the Elliotts to assert their claims, and the inability of the Elliotts to pursue their claims against the GUC Trust has been due to factors entirely beyond the Elliotts’ control, namely the concealment of the true nature of the defect from the Elliotts until July 2, 2014, and the Scheduling Orders of this Court which precluded Non-Ignition Switch Plaintiffs from pursuing their late claims until now. When New GM finally recalled the Elliotts’ dangerous door module for replacement on July 2, 2014, the Elliotts had already been enjoined by this Court from proceeding with their claims in any way, and had already been assured that their inability to file proofs of claims against the GUC Trust would not be used against them by the Trust later. The Elliotts have acted reasonably and with dispatch to

press their claims against the Trust here after awaiting the resolution of the 2014 and 2016 Threshold Issues.

### **CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, the Elliotts should be permitted to file their proposed proof of claim, attached as Exhibit 1, with respect to the defects in their 2006 Chevrolet Trailblazer.

Alternatively, the Elliotts should be permitted to develop a factual record through discovery with respect to the factual issues presented by their proposed proof of claim, including discovery related to the whether Old GM knew or should have known of the driver's power door module switch, and whether the publication notice of the bar date was reasonably calculated to reach the Elliotts and other GM vehicles owner and to apprise them of the relevance of the bankruptcy proceedings to their potential claims.

Dated: January 21, 2019

Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Gary Peller  
Gary Peller  
600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W.  
Washington, DC 20001  
(202) 662-9122  
peller@georgetown.edu  
*Counsel for Celestine Elliott and  
Lawrence Elliott*

Fill in this information to identify the case:

Debtor 1  
Motors Liquidation Company, et al.

Debtor 2  
(Spouse, if filing)

United States Bankruptcy Court for the: Southern District of New York

Case number  
09-50026 (MG) (Jointly Administered)

Official Form 410

Proof of Claim

04/16

Read the instructions before filling out this form. This form is for making a claim for payment in a bankruptcy case. Do not use this form to make a request for payment of an administrative expense. Make such a request according to 11 U.S.C. § 503.

Filers must leave out or redact information that is entitled to privacy on this form or on any attached documents. Attach redacted copies of any documents that support the claim, such as promissory notes, purchase orders, invoices, itemized statements of running accounts, contracts, judgments, mortgages, and security agreements. Do not send original documents; they may be destroyed after scanning. If the documents are not available, explain in an attachment.

A person who files a fraudulent claim could be fined up to \$500,000, imprisoned for up to 5 years, or both. 18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157, and 3571.

Fill in all the information about the claim as of the date the case was filed. That date is on the notice of bankruptcy (Form 309) that you received.

Part 1: Identify the Claim

1. Who is the current creditor?

Lawrence Elliott and Celestine Elliott

Name of the current creditor (the person or entity to be paid for this claim)

Other names the creditor used with the debtor

2. Has this claim been acquired from someone else?

☒ No

☐ Yes.

From whom?

3. Where should notices and payments to the creditor be sent?

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (FRBP) 2002(g)

Where should notices to the creditor be sent?

SEE ATTACHED RIDER

Name

Number

Street

City

State

ZIP Code

Contact phone

Contact email

Where should payments to the creditor be sent? (if different)

SEE ATTACHED RIDER

Name

Number

Street

City

State

ZIP Code

Contact phone

Contact email

Uniform claim identifier for electronic payments in chapter 13 (if you use one):

4. Does this claim amend one already filed?

☒ No

☐ Yes.

Claim number on court claims registry (if known)

Filed on

MM / DD / YYYY

5. Do you know if anyone else has filed a proof of claim for this claim?

☒ No

☐ Yes.

Who made the earlier filing?

Official Form 410

Proof of Claim

page 1



Part 2: Give Information About the Claim as of the Date the Case Was Filed

6. Do you have any number you use to identify the debtor?

☒ No  
☐ Yes. Last 4 digits of the debtor's account or any number you use to identify the debtor: \_\_\_\_\_

7. How much is the claim?

\$ SEE ATTACHED RIDER  
Does this amount include interest or other charges?  
☐ No  
☐ Yes. Attach statement itemizing interest, fees, expenses, or other charges required by Bankruptcy Rule 3001(c)(2)(A).

8. What is the basis of the claim?

Examples: Goods sold, money loaned, lease, services performed, personal injury or wrongful death, or credit card. Attach redacted copies of any documents supporting the claim required by Bankruptcy Rule 3001(c). Limit disclosing information that is entitled to privacy, such as health care information.  
Economic loss for door module defect (SEE ATTACHED RIDER )

9. Is all or part of the claim secured?

☒ No  
☐ Yes. The claim is secured by a lien on property.  
Nature of property:  
☐ Real estate. If the claim is secured by the debtor's principal residence, file a Mortgage Proof of Claim Attachment (Official Form 410-A) with this Proof of Claim.  
☐ Motor vehicle  
☐ Other. Describe: \_\_\_\_\_  
Basis for perfection:  
Attach redacted copies of documents, if any, that show evidence of perfection of a security interest (for example, a mortgage, lien, certificate of title, financing statement, or other document that shows the lien has been filed or recorded.)  
Value of property: \$ \_\_\_\_\_  
Amount of the claim that is secured: \$ \_\_\_\_\_  
Amount of the claim that is unsecured: \$ \_\_\_\_\_ (The sum of the secured and unsecured amounts should match the amount in line 7.)  
Amount necessary to cure any default as of the date of the petition: \$ \_\_\_\_\_  
Annual Interest Rate (when case was filed) \_\_\_\_\_ %  
☐ Fixed  
☐ Variable  
Amount necessary to cure any default as of the date of the petition. \$ \_\_\_\_\_

10. Is this claim based on a lease?

☒ No  
☐ Yes. Amount necessary to cure any default as of the date of the petition. \$ \_\_\_\_\_

11. Is this claim subject to a right of setoff?

☒ No  
☐ Yes. Identify the property: \_\_\_\_\_

Official Form 410

Proof of Claim

page 2


09-50026-mg Doc 14399-1 Filed 01/21/19 Entered 01/21/19 23:18:26 Proof of Claim Form Pg 3 of 3

12. Is all or part of the claim entitled to priority under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)?

☒ No  
☐ Yes. Check one:  
☐ Domestic support obligations (including alimony and child support) under 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(1)(A) or (a)(1)(B).  
☐ Up to \$2,850\* of deposits toward purchase, lease, or rental of property or services for personal, family, or household use. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(7).  
☐ Wages, salaries, or commissions (up to \$12,850\*) earned within 180 days before the bankruptcy petition is filed or the debtor's business ends, whichever is earlier. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(4).  
☐ Taxes or penalties owed to governmental units. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8).  
☐ Contributions to an employee benefit plan. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5).  
☐ Other. Specify subsection of 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)( ) that applies.  
\* Amounts are subject to adjustment on 4/01/19 and every 3 years after that for cases begun on or after the date of adjustment.

Part 3: Sign Below

The person completing this proof of claim must sign and date it. FRBP 9011(b).  
If you file this claim electronically, FRBP 5005(a)(2) authorizes courts to establish local rules specifying what a signature is.  
A person who files a fraudulent claim could be fined up to \$500,000, imprisoned for up to 5 years, or both.  
18 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157, and 3571.

Executed on date 01/21/2019 MM / DD / YYYY  
  
Signature

Check the appropriate box:  
☐ I am the creditor.  
☒ I am the creditor's attorney or authorized agent.  
☐ I am the trustee, or the debtor, or their authorized agent. Bankruptcy Rule 3004.  
☐ I am a guarantor, surety, endorser, or other codebtor. Bankruptcy Rule 3005.  
I understand that an authorized signature on this Proof of Claim serves as an acknowledgment that when calculating the amount of the claim, the creditor gave the debtor credit for any payments received toward the debt.  
I have examined the information in this Proof of Claim and have a reasonable belief that the information is true and correct.  
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

Print the name of the person who is completing and signing this claim:

Name

Gary Peller

First name

Middle name

Last name

Title

Counsel for Plaintiffs Celestine and Lawrence Elliott

Company

Identify the corporate servicer as the company if the authorized agent is a servicer.

Address

600 New Jersey Ave. NW  
Washington DC 20001

Contact phone

(202) 662-9122

City

State

ZIP Code

Email

eller@law.georgetown.edu

Official Form 410

Proof of Claim

page 3

**EXHIBIT 1**

*In re Motors Liquidation Company, et al. f/k/a General Motors Corp., et al.*  
Case No. 09-50026 (MG) (Jointly Administered)

**RIDER TO PROOF OF CLAIM OF LAWRENCE & CELESTINE ELLIOTT**

**Names of Claimants:** Lawrence Elliott and Celestine Elliott.

**Nature and Basis of Claim:**

1. Pursuant to this Proof of Claim, the Elliotts assert an economic loss claim against the bankruptcy estate of Motors Liquidation Company f/k/a General Motors Corporation and its affiliated debtors and the Motors Liquidation Company General Unsecured Creditors Trust. More specifically, the Elliotts allege claims of consumer protection violations, fraudulent concealment, implied warranty of merchantability, and unjust enrichment.

2. The Elliotts assert these claims on behalf of themselves and the following proposed Class:

All residents of the District of Columbia who, prior to June 2009, either owned or leased a GM vehicle subject to Recall No. 14V-404.

3. Mr. and Mrs. Elliott are 83 and 78 years of age, respectively. They have been married for fifty-four years. They are lifelong residents of the District of Columbia. They are each retired commercial drivers with over twenty-five years of on-the-road experience. While Mr. Elliott's physical condition makes walking difficult and prevents him from driving for extended periods of time, Mrs. Elliott has continued to drive part-time since her retirement, first as a "Ride-On" bus driver for the Washington D.C. transit authority, and more recently as a driver for Uber and Lyft. The Elliotts own a home in the District in which they reside with their adult children and grandchildren, as well with as their two young great-grandchildren, for whom Mr. and Mrs. Elliott provide care, and whom they regularly help transport to and from school, medical appointments, and elsewhere.

4. In 2006, the Elliotts paid the full manufacturer's suggested retail price for a new 2006 Chevrolet Trailblazer at a now-defunct GM dealership in Washington, D.C. In 2007, the Elliotts paid the full manufacturer's suggested retail price for a new 2007 Chevrolet Cobalt at the same GM dealership. After GM's public admissions, beginning in February 2014, that New and Old GM had failed to disclose and/or concealed from Plaintiffs and others a myriad of safety related defects in GM vehicles, the Elliotts became extremely hesitant to drive either of their GM vehicles. They feared for their own safety and, in particular, for the safety of their family members.

#### **GM's Practice of Concealing and Minimizing Safety Risks**

5. GM instituted policies and practices intended to conceal and minimize safety related risks in GM products from the Elliotts, Class members, investors, litigants, courts, law enforcement officials, the NHTSA, and other governmental officials. In furtherance of its illegal scheme, GM trained and directed its employees and dealers to take various measures to avoid exposure of safety related product risks.
6. Through their deception, GM recklessly endangered the safety of the Elliotts, Class members, their families, and members of the public.
7. GM's Chief Executive Officer Mary Barra admitted on behalf of the company that GM employees knew about safety-related defects in millions of vehicles and that GM did not disclose those defects as it was required to do by law. Ms. Barra attributed GM's "failure to disclose critical pieces of information," in her words, to GM's policies and practices that mandated and rewarded the unreasonable elevation of cost concerns over safety risks.
8. This case arises from GM's concerted and systematic practice and policy of denying, diminishing, and failing to remediate safety related hazards that GM vehicles pose.

9. GM mandated that its personnel avoid exposing GM to the risk of having to recall vehicles with safety-related risks by limiting the action that GM would take with respect to such risks to the issuance of a Technical Service Bulletin or an Information Service Bulletin.
10. GM directed its engineers and other employees to falsely characterize safety-related risks – including the risks described in this complaint – in their reports, business and technical records as “customer convenience” issues, to avoid being forced to recall vehicles as the relevant law requires, and/or to issue narrower recalls than the circumstances warranted.
11. GM trained its engineers and other employees in the use of euphemisms to avoid disclosure to the NHTSA and others of the safety risks posed by risks in GM products.
12. GM directed its employees to avoid the word “stall” in describing vehicles experiencing a moving stall, because it was a “hot word” that could alert the NHTSA and others to safety risks associated with GM products, and force GM to incur the costs of a recall. A “moving stall” is a particularly dangerous condition because the driver of a moving vehicle in such circumstances no longer has control over key components of steering and/or braking, and air bags will not deploy in any, increasingly likely, serious accident.
13. GM directed its engineering and other personnel to avoid the word “problem,” and instead use a substitute terms, such as “issue,” “concern,” or “matter,” with the intent of deceiving the Elliotts, Class members, and the public.
14. GM instructed its engineers and other employees not to use the term “safety” and refer instead to “potential safety implications.”
15. GM instructed its engineers and other employees to avoid the term “defect” and substitute the phrase “does not perform to design.”

of GM’s conduct, the amount of its unjust enrichment should be disgorged, in an amount according to proof.

**Amount of Claim:** The Claim is asserted in an amount to be proven at trial (or via estimation proceeding in the bankruptcy court).

**Related Litigation:** The Elliotts are plaintiffs in actions against General Motors LLC pending and consolidated in the *In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litigation*, 14-md-2543 (JMF), *Elliott et al v. General Motors LLC*, 14-cv-8382 (JMF) (Cobalt), and *Bledsoe et al. v. General Motors LLC*, 1:14-cv-7631 (JMF) (Trailblazer).

**Notice:** Gary Peller, Esq., 600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001

**Payment:** Gary Peller, Esq., 600 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20001

**COUNT III**  
**Implied Warranty of Merchantability**

60. The Elliotts bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the Proposed Class.
61. The Elliotts and all Class members purchased their vehicle under an implied warranty that the vehicle would be merchantable. DC Commercial Code §§28:2-314. Because of the door module defect, their vehicles are not fit for ordinary purposes for which such vehicles are generally used and are therefore not merchantable.
62. GM sold goods that were not merchantable, because those goods are not fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used – the vehicles were marketed and intended to be driven, but become unsafe under ordinary driving conditions.
63. The Elliotts and all Class members did not receive the full benefit of their bargain with GM and seek to recover an amount to make them whole, or seek to exercise their contractual rights of rescission and return to the status quo ante by allowing them to return their vehicles to GM for a full refund, and to seek any other rights and remedies afforded them as buyers injured by the total breach of the seller in failing to tender a merchantable product as promised.

**COUNT IV**  
**Unjust Enrichment**

64. The Elliotts bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the Proposed Class.
65. GM has benefitted from selling and leasing the Defective Vehicles, for more than they were worth as a result of their concealed defects, at a profit, and the Elliotts and all Class members have overpaid for the cars and been forced to pay other costs.
66. The Elliotts and all Class members conferred a benefit on GM, and it is inequitable for GM to retain that benefit. GM knowingly accepted the benefits of its unjust conduct. As a result

16. GM's managerial practices were designed to ensure that its employees and officials would not investigate or respond to safety-related risks, and thereby avoid creating a record that could be detected by governmental officials, litigants or the public.
17. In a practice GM management labeled "the GM nod," GM managers were trained to feign engagement in safety related product risks issues in meetings by nodding in response to suggestions about steps that they company should take. Protocol dictated that, upon leaving the meeting room, the managers would not respond to or follow up on the safety issues raised therein.
18. GM's lawyers discouraged note-taking at critical product safety meetings to avoid creation of a written record and thus avoid outside detection of safety-related risks and GM's refusal to respond to and/or GM's continuing concealment of those risks. GM employees understood that no notes should be taken during meetings about safety related issues, and existing employees instructed new employees in this policy. GM did not describe the "no-notes policy" in writing to evade detection of their campaign of concealment.
19. GM would change part design without a corresponding change in part number, in an attempt to conceal the fact that the original part design was risk. GM concealed the fact that it manufactured cars with intentionally mislabeled part numbers, making the parts difficult for GM, the Elliotts, Class members, law enforcement officials, the NHTSA, and other governmental officials to identify. GM directed dealers to misrepresent the safety risks associated with the product risks of its vehicles. GM followed this practice with respect to the dangerous ignition switched.
20. GM directed its lawyers and any outside counsel it engaged to act to avoid disclosure of safety related risks in GM products. These actions included settling cases raising safety

issues, demanding that GM's victims agree to keep their settlements secret, threatening and intimidating potential litigants into not bringing litigation, and settling cases for amounts of money that did not require GM managerial approval, so that management officials could maintain their veneer of ignorance concerning the safety related risks.

21. The systematic concealment of known defects was deliberate, as GM followed a consistent pattern of endless "investigation" and delay each time it became aware of a given defect. GM routinely chose the cheapest part supplier without regard to safety, and discouraged employees from acting to address safety issues.

22. Under the Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability and Documentation Act, 49 U.S.C. § 30101, et seq. ("TREAD Act"), and its accompanying regulations, when a manufacturer learns that a vehicle contains a safety defect, the manufacturer must properly disclose the defect. If it is determined that the vehicle is defective, the manufacturer may be required to notify vehicle owners, purchasers, and dealers of the defect, and may be required to remedy the defect.

23. When a manufacturer with TREAD Act responsibilities is aware of safety defects and fails to disclose them as GM has done, the manufacturer's vehicles are not safe.

24. The array of defects in GM vehicles that GM and New GM failed to disclose until New GM began issuing recalls for the defects in February 2014 includes: (1) ignition switch defect, (2) power steering defect, (3) airbag defect (4) brake light defect, (5) shift cable defect, (6) safety belt defect, (7) ignition lock cylinder defect, (8) key design defect, (9) ignition key defect, (10) transmission oil cooler line defect, (11) power management mode software defect, (12) substandard front passenger airbags, (13) light control module defect, (14) front axle shaft defect, (15) brake boost defect, (16) low-beam headlight defect, (17) vacuum line

53. GM sold the Trailblazer to the Elliotts in violation of the warranty of merchantability and fitness implied under the District's Commercial Code, §§28.2-314, 315. Violations of the Commercial Code constitute violations of the Consumer Protection Procedures Act.

54. Plaintiffs are entitled to the greater of actual damages or the statutory damages of \$1500 for each violation of the Consumer Protection Procedure Act, as well as costs and attorneys fees.

55. Plaintiffs are empowered by the Consumer Protection Act to proceed as representatives of the Public to protect the interests of District residents.

## **COUNT II**

### **Fraudulent Concealment**

56. The Elliotts bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the Proposed Class.

57. GM knew since August 2012 about the master power door switch hazard described above.

The facts that their vehicles presented the above described safety hazards was material to the Elliotts and Class members. The Elliotts and Class members had no reasonable way of learning of the hazards that GM knew about but failed to disclose.

58. GM's failure to disclose the risks, and its affirmative misrepresentations regarding the safety of the Elliotts' and Class members' vehicles, were intentional.

59. The Elliotts and the Class members reasonably relied on GM's communications and material omissions to their detriment. As a result of the concealment and/or suppression of facts, the Elliotts and the Class members have sustained and will continue to sustain injuries, consisting of the diminished value of their GM vehicles and the lost use and enjoyment of the vehicles that GM's actions have caused, and exposure to increased risk of death or serious bodily injury. GM's acts were done maliciously, oppressively, deliberately, with intent to defraud, and with reckless disregard to the Elliotts' and Class members' rights and well-being, in order to enrich GM.

adjudications with respect to GM's liability would establish incompatible standards and substantially impair or impede the ability of class and subclass members to protect their interests.

#### COUNT I

##### **The District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act**

49. The Elliotts bring this claim on behalf of themselves and the Proposed Class and as

Representatives for similarly situated District of Columbia residents.

50. GM violated the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act, D.C. Code § 28-

3904 et seq., by representing that its vehicles were safe and adequately engineered when in fact GM failed to disclose and actively concealed an unprecedented number of safety defects due in large part to GM's focus on cost-cutting over safety. The Elliotts and the Class members had no reason to believe that their vehicles possessed distinctive shortcomings; they relied on GM to identify latent features that distinguished their vehicles from similar vehicles without the safety related defects, and GM's failure to do so tended to mislead consumers into believing their vehicles were safe to drive.

51. Upon information and belief, GM was aware of the defects in the Elliotts' and Class members' vehicles, and the defects resulted from GM's devaluation of and disregard for safety, as detailed in part herein.

52. GM induced the Elliotts and members of the Class to purchase and retain their 2006 Trailblazer under false pretenses, and thus deprived them of the benefit of their bargain and saddled them with dangerously defective cars that were worth less than they would have been in the absence of the defects. The Elliotts and Class members also incurred repair costs and other expenses as a direct result of GM's fraud, and GM was unjustly enriched at the Elliotts' and Class members' expense.

brake booster defect, (18) fuel gauge defect, (19) acceleration defect, (20) flexible flat cable airbag defect, (21) windshield wiper defect, (22) brake rotor defect, (23) passenger-side airbag defect, (24) electronic stability control defect, (25) steering tie-rod defect, (26) automatic transmission shift cable adjuster, (27) fuse block defect, (28) diesel transfer pump defect, (29) base radio defect, (30) shorting bar defect, (31) front passenger airbag end cap defect, (32) sensing and diagnostic module ("SDM") defect, (33) sonic turbine shaft, (34) electrical system defect, (35) seatbelt tensioning system defect, and (36) master power door switch defect.

25. GM has received reports of crashes and injuries that put GM on notice of the serious safety issues presented by many of these defects. GM advanced its culture of concealment by actively denying liability for fatal accidents.

26. In 2005, Defunct GM customer Adam Powledge lost control of his vehicle, slamming into a highway median and killing himself and his four children. In the ensuing suit GM nefariously framed the incident as a suicide, disavowing any connection between the accident and an electrical failure, despite GM's knowledge that the Malibu Mr. Powledge drove had a steering defect that likely was the real cause of the tragedy. Then, in April 2014, GM finally admitted that Adam Powledge's Chevrolet Malibu had a steering defect that was consistent with the loss of control over the vehicle that led to his death and that of his four children. The Powledge saga is but one dramatic example of the lengths that GM, its attorneys, risk personnel, and others went to further the GM campaign of denial and deceit.

27. Despite the dangerous nature of many of the defects and their effects on critical safety systems, GM concealed the existence of the defects and failed to remedy the problems in an appropriate or timely manner.



***Failure to Disclose and Concealment of Master Power Door Switch Defect (Elliott's vehicle); NHTSA Campaign 14V404000.***

28. Lawrence and Celestine Elliott own a 2006 Chevrolet Trailblazer for which they paid full sticker price when they purchased it from a now defunct dealership in the District. The vehicles has had a host of problems, including two dangerous and frightening "moving stalls," in which the Trailblazer's electrical system turned off while Ms. Elliott was driving, resulting in loss of control over steering, braking, and the loss of power to the airbag system

29. The Trailblazer was installed with a Master Power Door Module Switch that became so dangerous that, in NHTSA Recall No. 14-404000, New GM advised owners that the vehicles must be parked outdoors to avoid unreasonable risks of fire. GM's treatment of the Trailblazer dangers has been consistent with the corporate culture that has engulfed GM's cost-containment approach to risk issues presented by GM vehicles: deny any hazard exists; if forced to concede the hazard, minimize its significance; and if nevertheless forced to act, insist on cheap rather than appropriate remediation.

30. NHTSA's Office of Defect Investigations (ODI) received a complaint about a fire starting in the driver's door of a 2006 Trailblazer as early as November 6, 2008.

31. This is the third recall New GM has conducted for this very same hazard, a process of denial and avoidance going back at least to 2012. In the previous two recalls, GM convinced governmental officials and assured vehicles owners that minor remediation—consisting of spraying the part with silicone rather than removing and replacing the dangerous part to eliminate the fire risk—would render the vehicles safe. GM failed to disclose the true nature of the risk, however. After years of denial, GM finally admitted in July 2014 that the Elliotts' 2006 Chevrolet Trailblazer was and may remain dangerous because of the risk that its electrical components will short and start a fire inside the driver's door.

- a. Whether the vehicles owned by class or subclass members during the class periods suffer from the dangerous hazards described herein.
- b. Whether the hazards posed an unreasonable danger of death or serious bodily injury.
- c. Whether GM imposed an increased risk of death or serious bodily injury on the Elliotts and class and subclass members during the Class period.
- d. Whether GM caused the Elliotts and class and subclass members to suffer economic loss during the Class period.
- e. Whether GM caused the Elliotts and class and subclass members to suffer the loss of the use and enjoyment of their vehicles during the class period.
- f. Whether GM had a legal duty to disclose the dangers described above to class and subclass members.
- g. Whether GM had a legal duty to disclose the dangers described above to the NHTSA.
- h. Whether class and subclass members suffered legally compensable harm.
- i. Whether GM violated the District of Columbia's consumer protection statute by concealing safety related hazards from the Elliotts and governmental officials.
- j. Whether the safety related hazards were material.
- k. Whether the Elliotts and Class Members are entitled to equitable relief, including, but not limited to, a preliminary and/or permanent injunction.

***SUPERIORITY***

47. The Elliotts and class and subclass members have all suffered and will continue to suffer harm and damages as a result of GMs' unlawful and wrongful conduct. A class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of this controversy. Absent a class action, most class and subclass members would likely find the cost of litigating their claims prohibitively high and would therefore have no effective remedy. Because of the relatively small size of the individual class and subclass member's claims, it is likely that few could afford to seek legal redress for GMs' misconduct. Absent a class action, class and subclass members will continue to incur damages, and GMs' misconduct will continue without remedy. Class treatment of common questions of law and fact would also be a superior method to multiple individual actions or piecemeal litigation in that class treatment will conserve the resources of the courts and the litigants, and will promote consistency and efficiency of adjudication. The class action is also superior for defendants, who could be forced to litigate thousands of separate actions.

48. GM has acted in a uniform manner with respect to the Elliotts and class and subclass members. Class and subclass wide declaratory, equitable, and injunctive relief is appropriate under Rule 23(b)(1) and/or (b)(2) because GM has acted on grounds that apply generally to the class, and inconsistent

43. Although the exact number of Class Members is uncertain and can only be ascertained through appropriate discovery, the number is great enough such that joinder for each Class or Subclass is impracticable. The disposition of the claims of these Class Members in a single action will provide substantial benefits to all parties and to the Court. Class Members are readily identifiable from information and records in GM's possession, custody, or control, and/or from public vehicular registration records.

*TYPICALITY*

44. The claims of the Elliots are typical of the claims of each member of the class and subclasses in that the representative Plaintiffs, like all class members, legally or equitably own or owned a dangerous GM vehicle during the time period noted above. The Elliots, like all class and subclass members, have been damaged by GM's misconduct, namely, in being wrongfully exposed to an increased risk of death or serious bodily injury, in suffering diminished use and enjoyment of their vehicles, and in suffering the diminished market value of their vehicles. Furthermore, the factual bases of GM's misconduct are common to all class and subclass members.

*ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION*

45. The Elliots will fairly and adequately represent and protect the interests of the class and subclasses. The Elliots have retained counsel with substantial experience in prosecuting consumer class actions and in prosecuting complex federal litigation. The Elliots and their counsel are committed to vigorously prosecuting this action on behalf of the class and subclasses, and have the financial resources to do so. Neither the Elliots nor their counsel have interests adverse to those of the class of subclasses.

*PREDOMINANCE OF COMMON ISSUES*

46. There are numerous questions of law and fact common to the Elliots and Class Members that predominate over any question affecting only individual Class Members, the answers to which will advance resolution of the litigation as to all Class Members. These common legal and factual issues include:

32. After years of denial, then false claims that it had repaired the vehicles and rendered them safe to drive, GM has admitted to the NHTSA that its prior two recalls and purported repairs—when it tried to take the cheap way out, and spray the switch with a chemical coating rather than actually replace and repair the faulty switch—were failures.
33. On August 16, 2012, GM notified the NHTSA that it was recalling “certain model year 2006 Chevrolet Trailblazer EXT and GMC Envoy XL and 2006-2007 Chevrolet Trailblazer, GMC Envoy, Buick Rainier, SAAB 9-7x, and Isuzu Ascender vehicles, originally sold or currently registered in Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia” (NHTSA Report Campaign No. 12V406000). The reason for the recall was that “[f]luid may enter the driver's door module, causing corrosion that could result in a short in the circuit board.” The consequence of this defect was listed in the report as follows: “A short may cause the power door lock and power window switches to function intermittently or become inoperative. The short may also cause overheating, which could melt components of the door module, producing odor, smoke, or a fire.”
34. The August 16, 2012 recall was limited to vehicles in the twenty aforementioned states and the District of Columbia. To owners outside of the aforementioned states, GM sent an Owner Notification Letter to owners of the affected vehicles instructing them to bring their vehicle to a GM service center only if they noticed switches that functioned “uncommanded, intermittently or become inoperative” or they noticed “an odor or overheated/hot switches.” The letter stated that owners should seek not repairs unless they observed these symptoms their vehicle.

35. The NHTSA was not satisfied with GM's geographic limitation of the August 16, 2012 driver door switch recall (NHTSA Action No. EA12004), and on June 13, 2013 GM notified the NHTSA that they were expanding the recall to cover the aforementioned vehicles in all states (NHTSA Report Campaign No. 13V248000). As part of the expanded recall GM notified consumers that unattended vehicle fire may occur in rare instances, yet also stated that the affected vehicles remained safe to drive.

36. On September 18, 2013, the Elliotts' 2006 Trailblazer was serviced pursuant to the previously issued recalls and a "protective coating" was applied as an attempt to address the defective driver door switch. The Elliotts' relied upon GM's assurance that the protective coating would address the defect and eliminate the risk of personal injury or property damage.

37. On April 1, 2014, the Elliotts filed a pro se complaint notifying GM that critical electrical components of the car had continued to operate ineffectively and presented risk of personal injury and property damage.

38. On July 2, 2014, GM issued a third recall concerning the defective driver door switch in the same vehicle models for the same defect and fire risk (NHTSA Campaign No. 14V404000). This new recall required additional remedy for vehicles "whose modules were modified but not replaced" under the previous two recalls. GM conceded that "[v]ehicles that were repaired by having a protective coating applied to the driver's door module may continue to have a safety related defect." This recall encompasses the following models: BUICK RAINIER 2006-2007; CHEVROLET TRAILBLAZER 2006-2007; CHEVROLET TRAILBLAZER EXT 2006; GMC ENVOY 2006-2007; GMC ENVOY XL 2006; ISUZU ASCENDER 2006-2007; SAAB 9-7X 2005-2007.

39. NHTSA's Office of Defect Investigations (ODI) has received 170 reports alleging a thermal event in the driver door switch in vehicles identified by GM's August 2012 recall. GM acknowledged the receipt of 619 unique consumer complaints related to the driver door switch, 77 of which led to fire with flame.

40. On June 30, 2014, New GM issued a safety recall of 181,984 MY 2005-2007 Chevrolet Trailblazer, 2006 Chevrolet Trailblazer EXT, 2005-2007 Buick Rainier, 2005-2007 GMC Envoy, 2006 GMC Envoy XL, 2005-2007 Isuzu Ascender, and 2005-2007 Saab 9-7x vehicles with a defect that can cause an electrical short in the driver's door module. In the affected vehicles, an electrical short in the driver's door module may occur that can disable the power door lock and window switches and overheat the module. The overheated module can then cause a fire in the affected vehicles.

#### CLASS ACTION ALLEGATIONS

41. The Elliotts assert a class action for themselves and on behalf of all other persons similarly situated as members of the proposed Class pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(3) and/or (b)(2) and/or (c)(4). This action satisfies the numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, predominance, and superiority requirements of those provisions. The Elliotts bring this claim on behalf of a proposed class defined as follows: residents of the District of Columbia who, since the inception of GM in October 2009, hold or have held a legal or equitable interest in a GM vehicle with a master power door switch hazard, as described in the recalls for these conditions above.

42. Excluded from the Class are: (1) GM, any entity or division in which GM has a controlling interest, and their legal representatives, officers, directors, assigns, and successors; (2) the Judge to whom this case is assigned and the Judge's staff; (3) governmental entities; and (4) those persons who have suffered personal injuries as a result of the facts alleged herein.

#### NUMEROSITY AND ASCERTAINABILITY

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

-----x	
<b>In re</b>	:
	:
<b>MOTORS LIQUIDATION COMPANY, <i>et al.</i>,</b>	:
<b><i>f/k/a General Motors Corp., et al.</i></b>	:
	:
<b>Debtors.</b>	:
	:
-----x	

**Chapter 11 Case No.**  
**09-50026 (REG)**  
**(Jointly Administered)**

CERTIFICATE OF PUBLICATION

I, Angela Ferrante, certify as follows:

1. I am a Director of the Business Reorganization Department of the Melville office of The Garden City Group, Inc., the claims and noticing agent for the debtors and debtors-in-possession (the "Debtors") in the above-captioned proceeding. The business address for the Melville office is 105 Maxess Road, Melville, New York 11747

2. On October 15, 2009, at the direction of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP, counsel for the Debtors, I caused publication of the **Notice of Deadlines for Filing Proofs of Claim (Including Claims Under Section 503(b)(9) of the Bankruptcy Code)** in the following publications:

Publication Name

*Financial Times*, Worldwide  
*The Wall Street Journal*, Global  
*The New York Times*, National  
*USA Today*, (Mon-Thurs) National  
*Detroit Free Press/Detroit News*  
*Le Journal de Montreal* (French)<sup>1</sup>  
*Montreal Gazette* (English)  
*The Global and Mail*, National  
*The National Post*

<sup>1</sup> The Certificate of Translation is attached hereto.

3. I certify under penalty of perjury that, to the best of my knowledge, the foregoing is true and correct.

Dated: Melville, New York  
October 23, 2009

/s/ Angela Ferrante  
Angela Ferrante























